Tanase's article begins by describing some common ideas that are thought to be the reasons for the less litigious nature of Japan. The first reason he explains is the Attitude Model. This model explains how the Japanese people believe that a claim depends largely on one person's relationship to the other. It is for this reason that courts are thought to be too rigid to find the proper solution to an individual's problems.
The second model is the Institutional Model. This model claims that the attitude model is entirely false, and that the Japanese, as a people, are very competitive. This model instead proposes that the people are actually discouraged from taking judicial actions through the actions of the Japanese government. This model suggests that the government actually keeps judiciaries understaffed and ineffective in order to keep litigation down. Yet, the model provides no explanation for why they do this.
Tanase actually propses his own explanation that is a sort of compromise between the Attitude and Institutional Models. He calls it the Management Model. It involves a delicately subdued demand for litigation through the offering of alternative means, such as the mediation we saw in the karaoke disputes. By doing this the government is able to continue to justify an understaffed judiciary.
I think the most eye-catching part of this article was the numbers as to what lawyers make in Japan vs. in America. In Japan an average legal fees comprise only 2 percent of total compensation paid, as opposed to America, where that number is 47 percent. That's a huge increase! I'm not entirely sure I understand the reason behind this, but my understanding is that this is in part due to the simpler nature of Japan's legal system. Tanase explains instances in which people receive counsel from non-lawyers. This leads me to believe that when Japan's legal system is utilized it is made more accesible to the average person.
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