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Lempert's research suggests that Hawaiian Samoans are discriminated against by the Hawaiian Housing Authority (HHA). He shows that Hawaiian culture stigmatizes the Samoans above other ethnicities. The majority of the cases in which Samoans were brought before the HHA, were due to lack of payment, but Lempert suggests that this is in part due to a tenant of their culture in which they are beholden to send money home to those who helped them emigrate to the United States, for family occasions, and to their churches.
Lempert also notes offhand comments by many members of the eviction board that demonstrate a prejudice towards the Samoans. These comments were made in such a way that the people probably didn't even think there was anything wrong with their attitudes toward the Samoans, and that they were entirely justified.
I find Lempert's questions very interesting. Are the Samoans being discriminated against? Their attitudes about where the money they make should be spent are very different from American values. So, should they be forced to reprioritize according to American values or should landlords be forced to accomodate their different priorities? Lempert seems to disregard this second question. He assumes that the HHA should simply grant more empathy to these cases, however I'm not so sure I agree. The owner's of these properties do have a legitimate expectation to be paid, and if the people aren't paying their rent they are not living up to their end of the deal. It would be interesting to hear more about this "discrimination" and I think it would be helpful to personally see the process in action.
Sunday, March 1, 2009
Automobile Accident Compensation In Japan
Tanase's article begins by describing some common ideas that are thought to be the reasons for the less litigious nature of Japan. The first reason he explains is the Attitude Model. This model explains how the Japanese people believe that a claim depends largely on one person's relationship to the other. It is for this reason that courts are thought to be too rigid to find the proper solution to an individual's problems.
The second model is the Institutional Model. This model claims that the attitude model is entirely false, and that the Japanese, as a people, are very competitive. This model instead proposes that the people are actually discouraged from taking judicial actions through the actions of the Japanese government. This model suggests that the government actually keeps judiciaries understaffed and ineffective in order to keep litigation down. Yet, the model provides no explanation for why they do this.
Tanase actually propses his own explanation that is a sort of compromise between the Attitude and Institutional Models. He calls it the Management Model. It involves a delicately subdued demand for litigation through the offering of alternative means, such as the mediation we saw in the karaoke disputes. By doing this the government is able to continue to justify an understaffed judiciary.
I think the most eye-catching part of this article was the numbers as to what lawyers make in Japan vs. in America. In Japan an average legal fees comprise only 2 percent of total compensation paid, as opposed to America, where that number is 47 percent. That's a huge increase! I'm not entirely sure I understand the reason behind this, but my understanding is that this is in part due to the simpler nature of Japan's legal system. Tanase explains instances in which people receive counsel from non-lawyers. This leads me to believe that when Japan's legal system is utilized it is made more accesible to the average person.
The second model is the Institutional Model. This model claims that the attitude model is entirely false, and that the Japanese, as a people, are very competitive. This model instead proposes that the people are actually discouraged from taking judicial actions through the actions of the Japanese government. This model suggests that the government actually keeps judiciaries understaffed and ineffective in order to keep litigation down. Yet, the model provides no explanation for why they do this.
Tanase actually propses his own explanation that is a sort of compromise between the Attitude and Institutional Models. He calls it the Management Model. It involves a delicately subdued demand for litigation through the offering of alternative means, such as the mediation we saw in the karaoke disputes. By doing this the government is able to continue to justify an understaffed judiciary.
I think the most eye-catching part of this article was the numbers as to what lawyers make in Japan vs. in America. In Japan an average legal fees comprise only 2 percent of total compensation paid, as opposed to America, where that number is 47 percent. That's a huge increase! I'm not entirely sure I understand the reason behind this, but my understanding is that this is in part due to the simpler nature of Japan's legal system. Tanase explains instances in which people receive counsel from non-lawyers. This leads me to believe that when Japan's legal system is utilized it is made more accesible to the average person.
Going To Court: Strategies Of Dispute Management In An American Urban Neighborhood
This article is about a single housing complex. Merry studies the diverse residents of this complex and observes how they resolve disputes amongst one another. She finds that there are differences in the use of violence and the use of courts across class, race, and gender lines.
To me the most interesting part of the article came right in the beginning when she says, "Courts come to serve simply as a sanction - a way of harassing an enemy - and an alternative to violence for those unable or unwilling to fight." She explains that courts are actually not as effective in resolving a dispute to either parties satisfaction as violence is. Violence provides an immediate and efficient means for one party to attain their desired outcome. In her study courts are only used when violence is either undesired by a party, or that party is unable to prevail in a violent altercation.
Merry also noted that many other means that were attempted tended to fall on deaf ears. For example when complaints were brought to the building manager, the managers would simply listen and hope that disputes would go away on their own. Very seldom was any authoritative action ever taken unless disputes were brought to court or violence was introduced. Perhaps we could learn from the Japanese method concerning the karaoke bars. Some sort of mediation program would certainly help to thwart this violence.
To me the most interesting part of the article came right in the beginning when she says, "Courts come to serve simply as a sanction - a way of harassing an enemy - and an alternative to violence for those unable or unwilling to fight." She explains that courts are actually not as effective in resolving a dispute to either parties satisfaction as violence is. Violence provides an immediate and efficient means for one party to attain their desired outcome. In her study courts are only used when violence is either undesired by a party, or that party is unable to prevail in a violent altercation.
Merry also noted that many other means that were attempted tended to fall on deaf ears. For example when complaints were brought to the building manager, the managers would simply listen and hope that disputes would go away on their own. Very seldom was any authoritative action ever taken unless disputes were brought to court or violence was introduced. Perhaps we could learn from the Japanese method concerning the karaoke bars. Some sort of mediation program would certainly help to thwart this violence.
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